Question Two. Whether the Angel merited Blessedness before receiving it

7. And because the solution of this question depends on the following question, I therefore ask - about the fifth distinctiona - whether the angel merited blessedness before receiving it.

a. a[Interpolation] About the fifth distinction, where the Master deals with the conversion of the good angels and the turning away of the bad angels, there are principally two questions; the first has regard to the conversion of the good, and it is^

8. That he did not:

Because something is only merited from submissions paid to man; but nothing is merited which is waited for, because “hope that is deferred afflicts the soul” (Proverbs 13.12); therefore the angel only merits what he has. But this would not be the case unless he merited by submission the blessedness he has.

9. Further, greater reward requires, according to reason, greater merit; but the angels have greater glory than many elect men;     therefore a greater merit was required in them. But a man is a wayfarer for a long time, and he has many meritorious and many difficult works; therefore the reward of the angels requires these; but there was not so great a interval before their blessedness - therefore etc     .

10. To the opposite is Augustine On Rebuke and Grace: “the holy angels, who stood firm, merited to receive the reward of that life;” wherefore, if they merited to receive it before they received it, then etc. (look at Augustine’s text).

I. To the Second Question

A. The Opinion held by Peter Lombard

11. In this second question the Master is not held to because, at the end of the fifth distinction, he approves more the opinion that says, “they were blessed before they merited it, and they did not merit blessedness itself.” But he says “they merited it in a way by submission paid to the elect” (as a soldier merits a horse by serving well on it in war).

12. For this opinion is not held to:

First, because if man had not been created, then the angel would not have had blessedness; for he would not have had intrinsic merit when all merit by which it might be merited is removed - the act by which blessedness could be merited; but this seems unacceptable, because one angel does not depend on another in meriting, and much less on a man.a

a. a[Interpolation] Likewise, an intrinsic act is meritorious when the extrinsic act is removed; therefore the angels could merit through the intrinsic act.

13. Further, someone does not merit to receive a thing because he will use it well after he has received it; for then a man could merit grace, because God who gives it foresees that he will use it well - and then grace would not be grace, because it would come from merits (though from merits not present in fact but foreseen). Therefore the angel did not merit blessedness if he only had it because of a good use foreseen in him by his submission toward the elect

14. Further, then the state of blessedness would not be certain of itself; for although the world were in fact to come to an end, and thereby the number of submissions to be finite (those paid out to the elect by certain of the angels) - yet the world could last longer, enduring for a thousand years or however long; yet, not for this reason would the state of blessedness be less certain but - on this supposition - the certitude of merit would not be as great as the reward would be; therefore this reward ‘certain of itself’ does not necessarily correspond, because of the fact it is certain of itself, to the merit ‘which is not certain’.

B. The Common Opinion and Scotus’ Opinion

15. Therefore the opinion is held that the angels merited their blessedness, and that they did so before they received it.

16. Clarification of the first point: because every nature attains its perfection by its proper operation; but the perfection and end of any rational creature is blessedness, which is natural only to God. Now every “such operation, which leads to the end, is either maker of the end, namely when the end does not exceed the virtue of the one operating (as medication in respect of health), or is meritorious of the end, namely when the end exceeds the virtue ‘of what operates for the sake of the end’, and then the end is expected from the gift of another; but ultimate blessedness exceeds both angelic and human nature; therefore both man and angel merit their blessedness,”Aquinas ST Ia q.62 a.4. ³ - and so the first point is plain.

17. The second point is made clear thus: the same thing cannot be from perfect and from imperfect grace; but merit is from imperfect grace, reward from perfect grace.

18. But this reason does not seem cogent, because it is possible for some soul to have as much grace on the way as it will have in the fatherland, although now it cannot have as perfect use of it as it will have in the fatherland; hence the same habit will remain, and it could remain equal, but the same act will not.

19. Therefore I make the second point clear differently, because the will does not at the same time will mutably and immutably, or fixedly (such that then it could not will the opposite) and not fixedly (such that at the time when it elicits the act it could will the opposite); but when it is rewarded it wills immutably, that is, insofar as it is considered as eliciting the act (and consequently, as naturally prior to the act itself, it operates for it) -but when it merits, it does not thus immutably will, but it seems as contingently eliciting to elicit it.

20. In favor of this, there are congruences also adduced, that the disposition should precede what it is the disposition for, and the way should precede the term; but merit is the disposition and the way with respect to blessedness;     therefore etc     .

C. To the Principal Arguments

21. To the arguments of this question.

As to the first [n.8], it is conceded that angels merit some accidental blessedness; but ‘submissions’ are as it were certain works redounding from the perfection of blessedness - as is true of acts ‘generated and proceeding from a perfect, generated habit’, which generate no perfection (nor do they intensify the habit because it is not intensifiable), but they only proceed from the full perfection of the habit; so it is here. But I concede that, in the way they merit accidental blessedness, they do not have it when they merit it; nor is there any ‘affliction’ from this, because they have essential blessedness, which they most of all will.

22. To the second [n.19] I say that the angels’ greatest merit was by their willing the ultimate end with an intrinsic act - when the bad were turned away from that end by being proud, as will be plain in distinction 4 [n.46]. But a multitude of merits is not required for a great reward, but one intense merit is much more required than a hundred thousand weak ones; and so there was in them a very intense movement of merit for that little interval during which they merited, to so great an extent, perhaps, that no man -according to common law - could have as intense an act of merit as they had.

II. To the First Question

23. As to the first question (in the fourth distinction) [n1], which depends on the solution of the other [n.7, 11-20], two things need to be seen: first, how many intervals must be posited for the angels - second what are those intervals.

A. How Many Intervals must be Posited for the Angels

1. The Possibility of Several Intervals

24. As to the first [n.23] manifold things can be said.

For two intervals can be posited: namely one in which the angels are in the term -and another single one preceding it, when they are on the way. And thus a certain doctor [Aquinas] posits that the angels were created together in grace in the first instant, and therein all merited; in the second instant these merited and those who interposed an obstacle did not, such that, had they not interposed it, they would have been rewarded as the others were.

25. However three intervals can be posited, and this in many ways:

In one way that in the first interval they all existed in their natural state, in the second the bad angels were in sin and the just in merit, in the third the bad in punishment and the good in grace and reward. And this seems the way of the Master [Lombard], who seems to say that the bad demerited having grace applied to them when it was being applied to the good, as if they had already sinned in the second interval before - in the third interval - grace was applied to the good; and then, in the third interval, the good had, all at once in duration, grace and glory.

26. In another way by positing three intervals such that in the first all were in their pure natural state, in the second the good were in grace and merit, the bad in demerit -and in the third both the former and the latter in the term.

27. In a third way by positing three intervals such that in the first interval all were created in grace and merited, in the second only the good stood in merit and the bad fell, in the third they were both in the term.

28. There can, in a different way, be posited four intervals, and this doubly:

In one way that in the first interval they were in their pure natural state, in the second the bad sinned, in the third grace was applied to the good and they merited, in the fourth the good were rewarded and the bad in like manner condemned.

29. In another way, that in the first interval all were in their pure natural state, in the second all were in grace, in the third the good stood (and merited) in grace and the bad failed, in the fourth both were in the term.

2. What Should be Thought

30. Now, in order to inquire into these ways [nn.24-29], six probable propositions must be supposed.

The first of these is: ‘those who merit up to the now of reward, are rewarded in that now’. The proof of this is that in that ‘now’ they are not on the way, because that ‘now’ is the now of reward; therefore in that ‘now’ none of them can demerit because they cannot now be prevented from receiving the due reward for the merit for the whole duration of merit completed up to that ‘now’.

31. There is a confirmation. For a man, existing in merit for the whole of his life, cannot demerit in the instant of death nor interpose an obstacle to his being rewarded; for he has merited that then impeccability should be given him so that he not be able to interpose an obstacle. And therefore, about those who merit for the whole interval of the way, it cannot be said that this man interposed an obstacle in the instant of reward and that man did not; for this seems to posit that the instant of reward is not the term but that the man is then on the way (or at least that he is on the way who can interpose an obstacle), and it seems irrational to interpose an obstacle.

And by this, the first opinion is at once rejected - because there cannot be only two intervals posited as it posits [n.29].

32. The second proposition is this, that ‘merit precedes reward in time’; and this is proved from the proof of the preceding question [nn.12-20]. And by this is rejected the first way of positing three intervals [n.25].

33. The third proposition is this, that ‘the whole interval of the way prefixed for any angel whatever was equal’; for this is likely, because just as the whole interval prefixed for man is up to the instant of death, so also there was prefixed for these angels and those an equal interval of existing on the way.

34. And from these three follows a fourth, that ‘when the good finally merited, then in the same instant the bad demerited’; for if they did not demerit, either they then merited, and consequently they would have been rewarded along with the good, from the first proposition; or they would then have been in the term - against the second proposition, because then the good were on the way; or they would then have been in their pure natural state, and thus they would still have been on the way in the following interval (when however the good were in the term), which is against the third proposition.

35. The fifth proposition is that ‘all were created uniform’.

36. From these propositions it follows that one must posit at least three intervals: namely one in which all are in the term, and another in which the good finally merit and the bad demerit, and a third in which all are created uniform (from the fifth proposition); and then, if it is posited that all were created in grace, the last way of positing three intervals is held. There can also probably be posited four intervals, according to those who posit four intervals [nn.28-29, 40].

37. But for further inquiry into the disposition of the angels in these intervals, a sixth proposition seems probable, that ‘any angel whatever was at some time in grace’, whether in the instant of creation or afterwards; for although it is not necessary - as will perhaps be said elsewhere [Ord. 4 d.1 p.4 q.1 nn.4-5, d.16 q.2 n.4] - that in order for someone to sin he first had grace, yet it is congruous that the angels were not only not unjust (because they received the natural liberty whereby they could preserve natural justice), but that they received gratuitous justice, according to Anselm Fall of the Devil 14-16, 18.

38. Likewise, it seems that this sixth proposition is proved by another, a seventh, namely that ‘God does not make separation between these and those before they separate themselves by their acts’ - because, according to Augustine On Genesis 11.17 (look there; and it is put in 2 d.4 of the Sentences, ‘Why these were separated and not those”, look there): “For God is not an avenger before anyone is a sinner.” Therefore up to the instant of merit and demerit they were all uniform.

39. And if grace was then first applied to the good, it seems that it should also then have been applied to the others; for before that instant they did not demerit; so why should grace not have been applied to them as also to the others who merited? But if they had then demerited it, therefore they did so before they had it, because grace and guilt do not exist together.

40. So if this sixth proposition be conceded, that ‘any angel - one sinning - was at some time in grace’, it necessarily follows that the three intervals (if three are posited) will be these: that the first will be of all of them in grace, and the second will be of these (the good) in merit and of those (the bad) in demerit, and the third will be of these and those in the term. Or if it be said that they were at some time in their pure natural state, then one must posit four intervals - such that all in the first interval were in their pure natural state, in the second all were in grace and the good merited and the bad demerited, in the third the good persevered in good and the bad in bad, and in the fourth these and those were in the term. And this last way about four intervals keeps several states in them and saves several affirmative authorities - and if this plurality is not pleasing (because it does not have evident necessity), then it is probable to posit at least the three intervals before assigned [above here n.40].

B. What these Intervals Were

41. About the second article, namely what were these intervals [n.23]? Although some posit that these were diverse by an instant of discrete time, yet, from 2 d.2 nn.153-167, it is plain that one should for no reason posit discrete time in angels but diverse ‘nows’ of the aevum.

42. But to what in our continuous time do those ‘nows’ of the aevum correspond? I say that the final interval, namely of existing in the term, corresponds to the whole time after the first instant of the blessedness of the good and the damnation of the bad. However the first interval, in which they were uniform, can be posited to have coexisted with our instant or with a part of our time. And one must make a posit consistent with this about the second interval; for if the first interval coexists with time and a final instant of it, then the second interval did not have any first instant in our time corresponding to it.

43. And although it seems to some that it was necessary for the angel to have first sinned in an instant (or with an instant) of our time, and although it seems to others that the angel would necessarily have to have sinned along with our time - the first indeed have on their side that between privative opposites in a subject naturally apt for them there is no middle, and when a subject is indivisible there is no cause of succession from term to term (neither on the part of the terms, nor on the part of the movable thing), and the second have on their side that ‘no created virtue acts in an instant, because then a greater virtue would act in less than an instant’ [2 d.2 nn.287, 505] - however neither of these reasons is conclusive. The point will be clear about the first in 3 d.3 q.1 nn.11-13, 9-10, where a reply will be given to that reason by maintaining that the soul of the blessed Virgin could precisely have been in sin for an instant and afterwards have been clean; nor is the second conclusive, but a response was given to it before [2 d.2 nn.505-506].

44. So in both ways it was possible both that the first interval of innocence coexisted with time and not with an ultimate instant of it, and that the second interval had a first instant of time coexisting with it - or that the first interval would coexist with time and an ultimate instant of it (or to one instant of time only), and then that the second interval did not have any first interval corresponding to it, just as neither is there a first change in continuous motion, from Physics 6.5.236a7-b18.

45. But of what sort was the second interval in itself - was it instantaneous or indivisible?

It seems that it was not, for two reasons:

First, because the bad angels sinned with many sins, of diverse species, and did not have all their acts at once [d.7 n.18 below]; therefore they had one after another - and thus, in the whole interval during which they had those acts, they were on the way (otherwise the later acts would not have been demerits for them, but as it were punishments for them as they exist in the term).

46. Second, because to the good angels is ascribed for their great merit that they overcame the battle of temptation, Revelation 12.7-8, “A great battle was waged in heaven; Michael and his angels battling with the dragon, and the dragon was fighting and his angels etc.” For if there were precisely one instant in which the bad demerited and the good merited, that battle would not have existed in it nor the victory over temptation, and thus this victory would not be ascribed to them for their praise and their excelling merit. -The proof of the assumption is that, if there had been only one instant, the bad would have sinned and the good would have merited at the same time; but in the instant of nature in which the bad sinned, their sin did not tempt the good; for it did not tempt them save posterior in nature to its being committed by the bad. Therefore the good overcame temptation after the bad sinned, and so this fact proves that the interval of demerit of the bad was not indivisible; and from this it follows that neither was the interval indivisible of the merit of the good (because they were equals, from the fifth proposition [n.35]), and the second way [here n.46 above] proves this specifically of the interval of the merit of the good.

C. To the Principal Arguments

47. To the principal arguments [nn.2-5]

To the first [n.2] I say that the consequence is not valid.

48. To the proof of the consequence [n.4] I say that God could have given the angels blessedness in the instant of creation had he wished, but it was more glorious to have it from merit - and thus did his wisdom dispose. But the merit could not exist - on the supposition of the divine liberty, which created them all equal - save in at least two intervals preceding the blessedness [nn.40, 36].

49. To the other argument [n.5]: although the likeness of grace and glory to guilt and punishment may be denied, nevertheless I say that the bad were not bad with culpable demerit and at the same time damned, because they were not on the way and at the same time in the term (as neither were the good); and although they are at one time in guilt, yet they are not at another time demeriting - as wayfarers when eliciting an act whose eliciting is imputed to them for demerit.

D. To the Reason for the Opinion Positing only Two Intervals

50. To the reason which is relied on for the opinion that posits only two intervals, namely [Aquinas] ‘because angels understand non-discursively and thus do they acquire their perfection’ - I reply:

If they would, because of this, have been blessed at once after one act, it would follow that the bad - who according to the same doctor [n.24] merited in the first instant - would have been blessed and would never have sinned; therefore the assumption [sc. about non-discursive understanding] is false of the natural perfection of angels (as was touched on in 2 d.3 p.2 nn.315, 325), and is much more false of the supernatural perfection that they acquire meritoriously. For this latter perfection is according to the acceptation of the one who gives the reward, whose law it is that “he who perseveres to the end will be saved” - and he who falls will be condemned (Matthew 10.22, 24.13); and therefore, if at some point they merited and did not persevere for the whole interval deputed to the way, they did not sufficiently merit eternal blessedness.